Deductive Verification of Unmodified Linux Kernel Library Functions by Efremov, Denis et al.
Deductive Verification of Unmodified Linux
Kernel Library Functions
Denis Efremov1,2, Mikhail Mandrykin2, and Alexey Khoroshilov1,2,3,4
1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
2 Ivannikov Institute for System Programming of the RAS, Moscow, Russia
3 Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, Russia
4 Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
defremov@hse.ru, {mandrykin,khoroshilov}@ispras.ru
Abstract. This paper presents results from the development and evalu-
ation of a deductive verification benchmark consisting of 26 unmodified
Linux kernel library functions implementing conventional memory and
string operations. The formal contract of the functions was extracted from
their source code and was represented in the form of preconditions and
postconditions. The correctness of 23 functions was completely proved
using AstraVer toolset, although success for 11 functions was achieved
using 2 new specification language constructs. Another 2 functions were
proved after a minor modification of their source code, while the final
one cannot be completely proved using the existing memory model. The
benchmark can be used for the testing and evaluation of deductive verifi-
cation tools and as a starting point for verifying other parts of the Linux
kernel.
Keywords: formal verification, deductive verification, Linux kernel
1 Introduction
Deductive verification is one of the most rigorous techniques to ensure software
satisfies its requirements. In spite of significant advances in tool support, it still
requires deep user involvement in the verification process to provide manual
guidance (e. g., to specify the contract of each function and to identify loop
invariants). As a result deductive verification is used mainly to analyze the most
critical pieces of software.
Under such conditions, it is more cost-effective to rewrite code to make it
easier to verify than to implement support for all the complex corner cases in
the semantics of the target programming platform, most notably in low-level
platforms based on C which lack well-defined semantics for many cases widely
used in practice.
Nevertheless, there are situations where changing the code under verification
is undesirable or even impossible. For example, components to be integrated
into a predefined framework have to follow the coding style, interfaces and data
structures of that framework. We have met such limitations with Linux kernel
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modules where a lot of implementation details are imposed by Linux kernel core
infrastructure.
One of the well-established approaches to specifying the behavioral contract
of functions written in C is ANSI/ISO C Specification Language (ACSL) [1].
Frama-C [2] provides a framework for an analysis of C programs with optional
ACSL specification annotations. Frama-C integrates specifications and code into
a single intermediate representation and allows plugins to work with it. There
are two plugins for deductive verification built on top of Frama-C: WP [2] and
Jessie [3].
Because existing plugins were not able to correctly handle many constructs
widely used in the Linux kernel (e. g., container_of, pointer type reinterpretation
between integer types of different size), we started developing a new deductive
verification AstraVer plugin based on Jessie. We implemented and proposed
many improvements for the toolchain, including a new memory model [4], but
there is no representative benchmark to evaluate the progress. The primary
purpose of this work is to fill this gap.
Following previous efforts [5,6], we have chosen for the first step Linux kernel
library functions implementing conventional memory and string operations. The
benchmark built from such functions helped us to detect a number of local tool
issues and several fundamental problems discussed below.
The main contributions of the paper include:
– a benchmark of unmodified Linux kernel library functions extended with
annotations formalizing their contracts in the form of preconditions and
postconditions [7];
– a new approach to annotate modulo arithmetic operations on values of
integral C types;
– evaluation of AstraVer deductive verification toolchain on the benchmark.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses similar efforts aimed
at the specification and deductive verification of C library functions. Section 3
provides background on ACSL basic concepts. Section 5 presents improvements
in the toolchain made during the development of the benchmark. Sections 6
describes specification techniques designed and applied for specification of library
functions. Section 7 defines a set of open problems. Section 8 presents the
evaluation of the solvers. Section 9 summarizes the results of the work.
2 Related Work
Since the deductive verification tools, WP and Jessie are mature enough
there are many examples where these tools were applied for verification of real-life
software. In [6] 12 string functions from OpenBSD were examined, using Jessie
as a deductive verification plug-in. The correctness of 7 functions was fully proved
(all verification conditions, or VCs, were successfully discharged). For the other 5
functions, some VCs were left unproved. The author did three iterations on the
development of a specification contract for each function. First, one was developed
based on the standard and the author’s experience. The second one was developed
based on informal documentation (man pages) exclusively. The final one was
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written based on the implementation (source code) and the man pages. The final
revision in most cases has significant differences from previous versions. Thus it
shows that it is difficult to develop a formal specification in ACSL language for
already developed source code without taking the implementation into account.
However, such an iterative approach allowed the author to find inaccuracies in the
documentation for several functions, and a lack of documentation completeness
in many cases.
To prove some functions, the author changed the source code. Changes were
performed in two specific situations. In the first case char * type in strcmp
and strncmp functions were cast to unsigned char *. In the second case, the
unsigned loop iterator in strlcat underflowed at the last iteration step due to the
postfix decrement. The loop termination, in this case, occurs when the variable
equals zero, but after comparison, the value of the variable is still decreasing by
one. This results in the unsigned integer underflow (which is not an undefined
behavior). However, the unsigned underflow does not lead to an error in the
code: after the loop, the variable is not used anywhere. But in this situation, it
is not possible to prove the VC demanding the absence of an integer overflow
(more generally, over- or underflow). The VC is necessary due to the use of the
defensive integer model (see section Section 5.2) when the bounded integers are
modeled using mathematical unbounded integers assuming the absence of integer
overflows. To prove the VCs, Alt-Ergo (0.7.3), Simplify (1.5.4) and Z3 (2.0)
solvers were used.
In [5] authors used Frama-C with the WP deductive verification plugin to
verify the functions of the klibc library. The authors were able to fully prove
14 string functions. For 12 functions some VCs were not discharged. Four more
functions failed to analyze due to errors in the verification tools. In addition
to the string functions (from string.h), functions from the stdio.h were also
analyzed. As noted by the authors, almost all functions from this header file use
system calls, which in most cases results in a weak specification. To overcome
the limitations of the verification tools and to simplify the generated VCs the
authors made changes to the source code.
The authors analyzed in advance the problems with type casts modeling (for
example, unsigned char * to char *) and modified the code to exclude such
operations. The authors also faced the code pattern with the postfix decrement
in a while loop. To prove the VCs, Alt-Ergo (0.95.1), CVC3 (2.4.1) and Z3
(4.3.1) solvers were used.
The most comprehensive document on ACSL specifications development is
ACSL by Example [8]. It contains ACSL specifications for functions from the C++
standard library (Standard Template Library). Initial implementation converted
from C++ function templates to C functions that work on arrays of type int. The
authors regularly update the document with new specifications and functions,
bug-fixes, etc. This project started in 2009. The document contains a number of
fully verified functions. They were proved with Alt-Ergo, CVC3, CVC4, Z3,
and EProver solvers. Authors use the WP deductive verification plugin.
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GrammaTech report [9] describes typical problems the authors encountered
when developing specifications for the GTlibc library. Frama-C with WP was
used. Among other points, the authors report memory model problems with
pointers type casts and pointers comparison.
3 ACSL
ACSL is designed to be suitable for specifying safety properties of C programs,
including contract specifications (pre- and postconditions) and assertions with
arbitrary predicates on one or several memory states. The language also supports
the specification of function frame conditions, axiomatic theories and additional
annotations required by particular verification tools to check the specified prop-
erties (examples of additional specifications are loop invariants and pragmas).
ACSL includes specification constructs for expressing C-specific attributes related
to explicit low-level memory management such as start addresses and lengths
of allocated memory blocks, pointers with support for arbitrary pointer type
conversions and accessibility predicates for read-only and read-write access.
1 /∗@ requ i r e s va l id_st rn ( s , count ) ;
2 a s s i g n s \ nothing ;
3 behavior e x i s t s :
4 assumes ∃ char ∗p ; s≤p<s+s t r n l e n ( s , count ) ∧ ∗p ≡ ( char %)c ;
5 ensure s s ≤ \ r e s u l t ≤ s+s t r n l e n ( s , count ) ;
6 ensure s ∗\ r e s u l t ≡ ( char %) c ;
7 ensure s ∀ char ∗p ; s ≤ p < \ r e s u l t ⇒ ∗p ̸≡ ( char %)c ;
8 behavior not_ex i s t s :
9 assumes ∀ char ∗p ; s ≤ p < s+s t r n l e n ( s , count ) ⇒ ∗p ̸≡ ( char %)c ;
10 ensure s \ r e s u l t ≡ \ nu l l ;
11 complete behav ior s ;
12 d i s j o i n t behav ior s ; ∗/
13 char ∗ s t rnchr ( const char ∗ s , s i z e_t count , i n t c ) {
14 //@ ghost char ∗ os = s ;
15 //@ ghost s i z e_t ocount = count ;
16 /∗@ loop inva r i an t 0 ≤ count ≤ ocount ;
17 loop i nva r i an t os ≤ s ≤ os+s t r n l e n ( os , ocount ) ;
18 loop i nva r i an t s−os ≡ ocount−count ;
19 loop i nva r i an t va l id_st rn ( s , count ) ;
20 loop i nva r i an t s t r n l e n ( os , ocount ) ≡ s−os+s t r n l e n ( s , count ) ;
21 loop i nva r i an t ∀ char ∗p ; os ≤ p < s ⇒ ∗p ̸≡ ( char %) c ;
22 loop var i ant count ;
23 ∗/
24 f o r ( ; count−−/∗@%∗/ && ∗ s != ’ \0 ’ ; ++s )
25 i f (∗ s == ( char ) /∗@%∗/ c )
26 re turn ( char ∗) s ;
27 re turn NULL;
28 }
Listing 1. from Linux 4.12, lib/string.c
Let’s consider an example of a simple C function with an appropriate
ACSL specification. Listing 1 presents one of the implementations for func-
tion strnchr from the Linux kernel. The function searches for the first occurrence
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of character c in a string s of length bounded by the parameter cnt. The pre-
condition in line 1 requires the string s to address a valid memory area of length
min(strlen(s), cnt) + 1. strnchr is a pure function, the absence of effects on
memory state is specified in line 2. The further specification is split into two
cases: The first one when the string includes the searched character and the
second one when it does not. ACSL includes a special construct for such compos-
ite specifications, which is called behaviors. In ACSL behaviors are not treated
as syntactic sugar (unlike, e. g., JML), but fully integrated into the language
such that nearly all specification constructs both in contracts and in function
bodies are attributed to one or several behaviors and thus different behaviors of
a function are intended to be checked separately. To verify the function strnchr
against its contract specification with a deductive verification tool, the loop
invariant and a ranking function (loop variant) are specified in lines 16–22.
The implementation of strnchr contains an intentional type cast (char)c in
line 25 and a postfix decrement of a loop iterator count in line 24. In both of
those cases, the corresponding operation (type cast or decrement) discards some
parts of the bitwise representation of the argument (higher bits of the int value
and the sign bit correspondingly), which corresponds to the intention of the
programmer. To distinguish those intentionally overflowing operations, whose
semantics is described in terms of bitwise interpretation of bounded integers, we
introduced a special annotation construct /*@%*/.
4 Region separation in Jessie
Since there are two deductive verification plugins for the Frama-C platform,
we had to make a choice between Jessie and WP. While there may be many
arguments for choosing a more up-to-date and actively maintained WP plugin,
which, among others, has capabilities for bitwise modelling of in-memory data
representation and support for interactive proofs, here we emphasize that our
initial justification for choosing Jessie over WP was due to its more flexible
architecture that enabled easier experimentation with custom ACSL extensions
(including the composite integer model described in section Section 5.2) and also
its support for region-based modelling of the heap.
In particular, the heap in Jessie is separated into disjoint regions according
to the results of a preliminary conservative static analysis presented in [10]. While
the separation analysis is coarse (so that its soundness is easy to establish), it
is still useful in many cases arising during verification of imperative code. For
example, consider the following loop invariant:
1 /∗@ loop inva r i an t \ at ( src , Pre ) ≤ s r c ≤
2 \ at ( src , Pre)+ s t r l e n (\ at ( src , Pre ) ) ;
3 loop i nva r i an t \ at ( dest , Pre ) ≤ dest ≤
4 \ at ( dest , Pre)+ s t r l e n (\ at ( src , Pre ) ) ;
5 / / . . .
6 ∗/
7 whi le ( (∗ dest++ = ∗ s r c++) != ’ \0 ’ )
8 ;
Listing 2. from Linux 4.12, lib/string.c
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Here, in general, proof of the fact that strlen{LoopCurrent}(\at(src, Pre))
== strlen{Here}(\at(src, Pre)) holds at the end of every iteration requires
inductive reasoning since the definition of strlen is recursive and the side effect
of the assignment *dest++ = *src++ can generally interfere with the memory
footprint of the function strlen. But the static separation analysis implemented
in Jessie assigns disjoint memory regions to the pointers dest and src and so
both applications of strlen to src before and after the loop iteration are encoded
using a heap variable separate from that of dst and therefore literally coincide. So
in Jessie the non-interference trivially holds and does not require any additional
proof effort. In general, the separation analysis is imprecise and may require
explicit weakening, e. g., if the surrounding function can be called in context with
more aliasing (e. g., when src may intersect with dest), but it can still considerably
simplify the verification by eliminating the need in inductive framing lemmas.
5 Limitations of the current implementation
5.1 Jessie byte-level block memory model
There are a number of ways to logically represent pointers and memory blocks
in the generated VCs. Jessie implements the byte-level block memory model [3],
where pointers are logically represented as pairs of the form (𝑙, 𝑜) and memory
blocks are represented as triples of the form (𝑙, 𝑎, 𝑠). Here 𝑙 is a label uniquely
identifying a memory block, 𝑜 is the offset of the pointer from the starting address
𝑎 of the block 𝑙, and 𝑠 is the size of the block. The introduction of unique block
labels allows us to ensure that no memory access occurs beyond the bounds of the
pointed memory block even if the corresponding memory area is also allocated.
Although such access cannot break segmentation checks, it is forbidden by C
standard [11] (subsection 6.5.6, paragraph 8 classifies out-of-bounds pointers,
except for pointers to the one past the last element of an array, as undefined). As
explained in [3] describing the design choices behind the Jessie tool, byte-level
block memory model in principle allows us to express common but non-standard
C code fragments, such an implementation of the function memmove, while
retaining the ability to detect use-after-free memory safety errors and potential
pointer overflows.
The actual implementation of the memory model in the tool, however, diverges
from its simple theoretical description in several ways and imposes a number of
additional restrictions on the supported subset of C.
First, pointers are implemented in the corresponding Jessie theory (in
WhyML) as values of an abstract type pointer with four corresponding abstract
operations:
sub_pointer : pointer× pointer→ int,
shift : pointer× int→ pointer,
same_block : pointer× pointer→ bool, and
address : pointer→ int.
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Block sizes are represented implicitly by so-called allocation tables, mutable values
of an abstract type with two axiomatically defined functions
offset_min : alloc_table× pointer→ int and
offset_max : alloc_table× pointer→ int.
The functions represent the minimal and maximal allowed offset of a pointer in
its corresponding allocated memory block i. e., for a pointer 𝑝 = (𝑙, 𝑜) and its
corresponding memory block (𝑙, 𝑎, 𝑠) which has size 𝑠 in the state represented by
allocation table 𝑡, offset_min(𝑡, 𝑝) = −𝑜, offset_max(𝑡, 𝑝) = 𝑠− 𝑜− 1. Thus a
pointer 𝑝 can be safely dereferenced iff 0 ≤ 𝑜 ≤ 𝑠− 1 i. e., offset_min(𝑡, 𝑝) ≤ 0∧
offset_max(𝑡, 𝑝) ≥ 0. We denote this condition as valid(𝑡, 𝑝). There is no direct
representation for block labels (𝑙) or starting addresses (𝑎) of the memory blocks.
The VCs generated for dynamic memory allocations and deallocations (function
calls to kmalloc and kfree are treated specially in Jessie1) involve only alloca-
tion tables and functions sub_pointer, shift and same_block. This makes the
corresponding axiomatization inherently incomplete. In particular, the function
address is not only left entirely uninterpreted in the current implementation,
but cannot be even theoretically given a complete axiomatization. Consider the
following property of this function: two valid pointers from different blocks cannot
have the same address. It cannot be expressed as a logical proposition using the
current Jessie theory since this would involve bounded existential quantification
over all possible reachable states of the corresponding allocation table:
∀𝑝1, 𝑝2.
(︀∃𝑡. Reachable(𝑡) ∧ valid(𝑡, 𝑝1) ∧ valid(𝑡, 𝑝2))︀ ∧ ¬same_block(𝑝1, 𝑝2)
=⇒ address(𝑝1) ̸= address(𝑝2).
Since the problem of inferring an explicit representation of the predicate
Reachable(𝑡) is undecidable, the tool should implement an implicit encoding
of the pointer address properties at every allocation point:
∀𝑝. valid(𝑡, 𝑝)
=⇒ address(𝑝) < address(𝑝*) ∨ address(𝑝) ≥ address(𝑝*) + sizeof (*𝑝*)× 𝑠,
where 𝑝* points to the start of a freshly allocated memory block of size 𝑠 ×
sizeof (*𝑝*) and 𝑡 is the state of the allocation table just before the allocation.
The unavailability of a precise formalization for the function address prevents
the generation of the appropriate VCs for potential pointer overflows and a more
flexible formalization of pointer comparison and difference operations (allowing
the verifation of functions such as memmove).
Moreover, the pointer offset and difference, as formalized by the functions
shift and sub_pointer, are measured in units equal to the sizes of the addressed
values, according to the pointer indexing semantics of C, rather than in bytes or
words. In particular, an expression p + 1, where p has type int *, is translated
roughly as 𝑝+1 rather than as 𝑝+𝑠, where 𝑠 is the size of the integer type (usually
equal to 4). Such translation immediately prevents many common combinations
of pointer casts and arithmetic, including the uses of the container_of macro. To
1 The special treatment is necessary because Jessie does not support arbitrary pointer
type casts, in particular, reinterpretation casts such as char *→int*, so the return
type of memory allocating functions should be specialized at each call site, which
can not be directly expressed in ACSL.
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see this, it is enough to consider two pointers: p + 1 and ((char *)p) + 1, where
𝑝 has type int * and points to the beginning of an allocated memory block. In
the byte-level block memory model with size-proportional offsets, these pointers
would have the same representation (𝑙, 1), while their actual addresses cannot
be equal (they should differ at least by 1, usually by 3). This contradicts the
functional consistency of the function address. To circumvent this contradiction
(and for other reasons, see [10, 12]) current Jessie implementation makes use
of two separate techniques. First, it introduces tag tables tracking the precise
dynamic types of the objects in the allocated memory. These tag tables allow us to
introduce the necessary checks for pointer shift operations in the generated safety
VCs (more on this in [12,13]). Second, it implements a number of normalizing code
transformations that rewrite nested structures and addressed fields of simple types
into pointers to separately allocated structures or values of the corresponding type
(the transformations are described in [10]). This allows us to express the addresses
of nested objects in the Jessie memory model. However, a combination of these
two approaches results in a number of significant restrictions. In particular, unions
containing nested structures as their members cannot be soundly represented
by the model. This is because that it is impossible to approximate statically
whether a pointer to a structure obtained, say, as a function parameter is actually
a pointer to a structure nested in some union and so writing to a field of this
structure should be translated into a strong coercion [12] of the corresponding
outer union possibly invalidating other representations of the underlying memory
and updating the tag table.
To address these and some other limitations of the current Jessie memory
model, a new model was proposed in [4]. This model, though, suggests simple
byte-level modeling of pointers. Since we usually assume an arbitrary memory
allocation strategy, this should not lead to missed C standard violations due to
the dereferencing of valid pointers in different memory blocks in practice. This
is because usually in such cases at least one of the possible arbitrary allocation
strategies leads to the dereference of an invalid pointer and thus it is impossible
to spuriously prove that such a dereference is safe. However, the memory model
suggested in [4] is not yet implemented in the tool. So in this study, we used the
current implementation of the Jessie memory model as-is.
The only change we made to the tool concerns the translation of pointer
inequalities. Since the current implementation does not provide enough sup-
port for arbitrary pointer comparisons, we restricted pointer inequalities to
support only pointers in the same memory block by generating the corre-
sponding VCs and changing the translation of the corresponding predicates
of the form 𝑝1 ♦ 𝑝2 into sub_pointer(𝑝1, 𝑝2) ♦ 0 ∧ same_block(𝑝1, 𝑝2) (here
♦ ∈ {>,<,=,≤,≥, ̸=}). This made many specifications slightly shorter as the
pervasive condition same_block(𝑝1, 𝑝2) was made implicit.
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5.2 Jessie integer models, composite integer model and modulo
arithmetic annotations
Jessie originally implements three logical models for machine integer types
of different size and signedness. The simplest model called math (or unbounded)
unconditionally encodes values of all integer types as mathematical integers. It
does not support overflow checks and does not model the wrap-around behavior of
machine integers. It in principle allows the modelling of some bitwise operations
on unbounded integers with an appropriate axiomatization, but in practice such
modeling is usually very inefficient. Another, most commonly used integer model
is called defensive (or bounded) and differs from the math model in two ways:
– for integer operations in code it generates appropriate VCs preventing arith-
metic overflows;
– bounded integral types in logic (i. e., in specifications) are mod-
eled by abstract types with special injection/projection functions
(e. g., int32_of_integer / integer_of_int32), thus only allowing the in-
jection of values fitting the destination type.
The defensive model is simple and efficient and is suitable for most cases except
when precise modeling of machine arithmetic or bitwise operations is needed. For
these purposes Jessie implements modulo integer model, which precisely models
values of integral types as bitvectors.
Unfortunately, the integer model in Jessie can only be chosen once for the
entire program analyzed using the corresponding pragma. In practice, however,
it is desirable to be able to choose the appropriate integer model on a very
fine-grained basis, down to every arithmetic operation. Consider the following
example:
1 i n t strncasecmp ( const char ∗ s1 , const char ∗s2 , s i z e_t l en ) {
2 unsigned char c1 , c2 ;
3 i f ( ! l en ) re turn 0 ;
4 do {
5 c1 = ∗ s 1++;
6 c2 = ∗ s2++;
7 i f ( ! c1 | | ! c2 ) break ;
8 i f ( c1 == c2 ) cont inue ;
9 c1 = tolower ( c1 ) ;
10 c2 = tolower ( c2 ) ;
11 i f ( c1 != c2 ) break ;
12 } whi l e (−− l en ) ;
13 re turn ( i n t ) c1 − ( i n t ) c2 ;
14 }
Listing 3. from Linux 4.12, lib/string.c
Here in lines 5 and 6 the modulo integer model would be suitable as the cast
from char to unsigned char may overflow and this is in line with the intention of
the programmer. However we would also like a potential overflow to be detected if
we accidentally change the return type of the function to char. So the defensive
integer model is suitable to model the subtraction in line 13.
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To support such fine-grained integer model selection, we implemented an
extension to the ACSL specification language with modulo arithmetic annotations.
The following new modulo arithmetic annotations were introduced:
– for arithmetic operations: +/*@%*/, –/*@%*/, */*@%*/, ...
– for compound assignments: +=/*@%*/, –=/*@%*/, /=/*@%*/, ...
– for prefix and postfix operators: ++/*@%*/, – –/*@%*/
– for explicit casts: (unsigned char)/*@%*/, ...
– for modulo arithmetic in logic: +%, –%, *%, ...
The integer model used to model both defensive (the default) and modulo
arithmetic operations is a combined one. In this model, bounded integers are
modeled as bitvectors with two injection/projection functions to/from the math-
ematical unbounded integers.
Let’s illustrate the encoding employed by the model on a sample arith-
metic operation +, a bitwise operation &, a relation <, and a sample
bounded integer type bint (with injection function to_int). The operation +
in logic is encoded simply as integer addition and has type int × int → int.
The operation +% in logic is encoded as bitvector addition and has type
bint× bint→ bint. It is also augmented with axioms relating the operation to
+, e. g., ∀𝑎, 𝑏 : bint. in_bounds(︀to_int(𝑎)+to_int(𝑏))︀ =⇒ to_int(𝑎+% 𝑏) =
to_int(𝑎)+to_int(𝑏). The operation & in logic is encoded as bitwise conjunction
with the same type as +%. The relation < in logic is encoded as either bitwise
or integer relation depending on the type of arguments. The bitwise relations
is augmented with an axiom relating it to the integer one. The operation 𝑎+ 𝑏
in code is encoded as an abstract operation (val in Why3ML) on bitvectors
with precondition requiring in_bounds(to_int(𝑎)+to_int(𝑏)) end ensuring two
postconditions: result = 𝑎+% 𝑏 and to_int(result) = to_int(𝑎)+to_int(𝑏).
The operation 𝑎+/*@%*/ 𝑏 in code is also encoded as an abstract oper-
ation with no precondition and two postconditions: result = 𝑎+% 𝑏 and
to_int(result) = norm(to_int(𝑎)+to_int(𝑏)), where norm stands for an ex-
pression for range normalization involving axiomatization of modulo arithmetic.
The operation & in code is an abstract operation with a straightforward postcon-
dition result = 𝑎& 𝑏. Finally, the predicate < in code is an abstract operation with
two postconditions result ⇐⇒ 𝑎 < 𝑏 and result ⇐⇒ to_int(𝑎)< to_int(𝑏).
Other operations are represented similarly.
This encoding enables construction of more expressive and predictable models
while avoiding direct use of any interpretation for function to_int, which usually
can’t be efficiently handled by the solvers. On the other hand, the use of quantified
axioms significantly reduces both predictability and performance of the solvers.
This can be potentially addressed by either adding some preliminary instantiation
step or implementing similar support for the necessary operations as an SMT
theory directly in the solver (by converting axioms into inference rules of the
theory).
Lastly, let’s demonstrate some practical capabilities of this integer model,
even in the naive implementation, with an example proof of a bit-twiddling trick
for computing average of two unsigned integers:
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1 //@ ensure s \ r e s u l t ≡ ( a + b) / 2 ;
2 unsigned average ( unsigned a , unsigned b)
3 {
4 /∗@ ghost unsigned long long r e s u l t 1 =
5 ( a ^ b) + ( ( unsigned long long ) ( a & b) << 1ULL) ; ∗/
6 /∗@ ghost unsigned long long r e s u l t2 =
7 ( unsigned long long ) a + b ; ∗/
8 //@ a s s e r t r e s u l t 1 ≡ r e s u l t2 ;
9 re turn ( a & b) + ( ( a ^ b) >> 1U) ;
10 }
Here the expressions in the ghost code trigger succinct instantiation of necessary
lemmas relating bitwise and integer interpretations of bounded integers (through
the double post-conditions of the corresponding Why3 operations).
The use of such a combined model and the introduction of new fine-grained
modulo arithmetic annotations allowed us to significantly simplify the specification
and verification of many functions included in this study.
6 Formal Specifications
We were guided by several techniques in the development of specifications: the
use of excessive specifications (explicit specifications and specifications that estab-
lish the correspondence with a logical function), the development of specifications
based on source code, and the context of function calls.
The results described in [6] show that the development of a function contract,
based exclusively on documentation is difficult: almost always, at the proof stage
we have to rewrite the specification based on the source code. This approach
is also explained by the fact that in this work we develop specifications on the
complete code. Linux code is not written in accordance with a certain set of
formal specifications. Also, the kernel does not have documentation for a lot of
functions. We intentionally did not follow the standard documentation (man
pages) for such functions, since their implementation in the kernel can differ from
the others (for example, from implementation in the standard library), and the
documentation is incomplete and may contain inaccuracies [6].
1 /∗@ pred i c a t e va l id_st rn ( char ∗ s , s i z e_t cnt ) =
2 ( ∃ s i z e_t n ; n<cnt ∧ s [ n ] ≡ ’\0 ’ ∧ \ va l i d ( s +(0 . . n ) ) ) ∨
3 \ va l i d ( s +(0 . . cnt ) ) ;
4 r e qu i r e s va l id_st rn ( s , cnt ) ;
5 a s s i g n s \ nothing ;
6 ensure s \ r e s u l t ≡ s t r n l e n ( s , cnt ) ;
7 behavior nul l_byte :
8 assumes ∃ Z i ; 0 ≤ i ≤ cnt ∧ s [ i ] ≡ ’ \0 ’ ;
9 ensure s s [ \ r e s u l t ] ≡ ’ \0 ’ ;
10 ensure s ∀ Z i ; 0 ≤ i < \ r e s u l t ⇒ s [ i ] ̸≡ ’ \0 ’ ;
11 behavior cnt_len :
12 assumes ∀ Z i ; 0 ≤ i ≤ cnt ⇒ s [ i ] ̸≡ ’ \0 ’ ;
13 ensure s \ r e s u l t ≡ cnt ;
14 complete behav ior s ; d i s j o i n t behav ior s ; ∗/
15 s i z e_t s t r n l e n ( const char ∗ s , s i z e_t cnt ) ;
Listing 4. strnlen contract
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Following this approach, the specifications for some functions have a slightly
more detailed view. For example, for strn* functions (see Listings 4 and 5) we do
not require the presence of the string’s end marker. In the strnlen’s precondition
(see Listing 4), it is assumed that the string should be valid until the minimum
of the string’s length (if there is one) and the second argument of the function
strnlen. The return value is explicitly specified in the postcondition. In the
strncmp case (see Listing 5), there are also no restrictions on the fact that the
input strings must contain a zero byte. This leads to the point where it is necessary
to explicitly describe the behavior of the function when the input strings with
end markers differ in length. We tried to maximally weaken the preconditions
and strengthen the postcondition in order to test the instruments of deductive
verification, the expressiveness of the ACSL language, and the capabilities of
solvers.
1 /∗@ requ i r e s va l id_st rn ( cs , cnt ) ∧ va l id_st rn ( ct , cnt ) ;
2 a s s i g n s \ nothing ;
3 ensure s \ r e s u l t ≡ −1 ∨ \ r e s u l t ≡ 0 ∨ \ r e s u l t ≡ 1 ;
4 behavior equal :
5 assumes cnt ≡ 0 ∨ ( cnt > 0 ∧
6 ( ∀ Z i ; 0 ≤ i<s t r n l e n ( cs , cnt ) ⇒ ( cs [ i ] ≡ ct [ i ] ) ) ∧
7 s t r n l e n ( cs , cnt ) ≡ s t r n l e n ( ct , cnt ) ) ;
8 ensure s \ r e s u l t ≡ 0 ;
9 behavior l e n_d i f f :
10 assumes cnt > 0 ;
11 assumes ∀ Z i ; 0 ≤ i<min ( s t r n l e n ( cs , cnt ) , s t r n l e n ( ct , cnt ) )
12 ⇒ cs [ i ] ≡ ct [ i ] ;
13 assumes s t r n l e n ( cs , cnt ) ̸≡ s t r n l e n ( ct , cnt ) ;
14 ensure s s t r n l e n ( cs , cnt)< s t r n l e n ( ct , cnt ) ⇒ \ r e s u l t ≡ −1;
15 ensure s s t r n l e n ( cs , cnt)> s t r n l e n ( ct , cnt ) ⇒ \ r e s u l t ≡ 1 ;
16 behavior not_equal :
17 assumes cnt > 0 ;
18 assumes ∃ Z i ; 0 ≤ i<s t r n l e n ( cs , cnt ) ∧ cs [ i ] != ct [ i ] ;
19 ensure s ∃ Z i ; 0 ≤ i<s t r n l e n ( cs , cnt ) ∧
20 ( ∀ Z j ; 0 ≤ j<i ⇒ cs [ j ] ≡ ct [ j ] ) ∧
21 cs [ i ] ̸≡ ct [ i ] ∧
22 ( ( u8 %)cs [ i ]<(u8 %)ct [ i ] ? \ r e s u l t ≡ −1: \ r e s u l t ≡ 1 ) ;
23 complete behav ior s ; d i s j o i n t behav ior s ; ∗/
24 i n t strncmp ( const char ∗ cs , const char ∗ ct , s i z e_t cnt ) ;
Listing 5. strncmp contract
6.1 Logic Functions
The specifications are redundant for some functions. In fact, they describe a
function’s behavior in two different ways. For example, strlen specification consists
of the usual functional requirements and the requirement for the correspondence
between the returned value and the logical function. This approach is motivated
by the fact that the logic function strlen is convenient to use in specifications of
other functions, e. g., strcmp (and a logical function that describes the behavior of
the function strcmp — when describing the functional requirements for strcpy).
All the basic properties of logic functions are specified by means of axioms and
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lemmas. The lemmas were not proved at the first stage presented in this paper
only contradiction checks were performed2. However, such specifications do not
suit all situations. For example, in the general case, they cannot be translated
by E-ACSL [18] as executable specifications. Therefore, for functions with an
associated logical function, the “usual” specifications were also developed.
A logical function can be associated with a C function (one-to-one) only if
the last one is “pure”. A logical function is useful for developing specifications of
other C-functions. For example, in postconditions of memcpy, you can express
the equality of src and dest by calling the memcmp logical function.
7 Open Issues
At the specification level, the authors faced many problems related to signifi-
cant inaccuracies in the modeling of pointer operations, as well as the insufficient
level of ACSL language support by the tools.
Thus, for the memmove function, there is the VC, which states that the dest
and src pointers should lie in the same allocated memory block. This is necessary
in order for the result of their comparison to be determined by the standard [11].
Recall how the memmove function works: it copies a memory area of n bytes
from the src address to dst, provided that the two memory regions can either
overlap or be disjoint. To implement the latter condition, the function performs
an ordinal comparison of the dest and src. In that case, if dest is located before
src the byte-by-byte copy from the beginning of src is performed (thus, if the
regions overlap, already copied part will be overwritten); if dest is located after
src, then copying is performed starting at the end of the src memory region.
The memory model implemented in AstraVer plugin allows arithmetic
operations on pointers (in memmove this is a comparison implemented through
the difference between pointers) only when the pointers belong to the same
allocated memory block. For memmove, this is not necessarily the case. If we
state in the specification contract that src and dest may belong to different
allocated memory blocks, then it is impossible to prove the VC that states that
they should belong to the same memory block. The unproved VC is reflected
in the results (Table 1). Although comparison of pointers to different memory
blocks is the undefined behavior in ACSI C, the comparison can be made defined
by casting the pointers to the corresponding underlying integral type. Yet adding
such casts is in odds with the goal of the presented work (verifying the functions
without modifications) and also not currently supported by the AstraVer
plugin.
The strcat function concatenates two strings by appending the src to the
dest. To do this, the end of the dest string is determined first. Then the src string
is copied in the same way as in strcpy. In order to prove the VCs that state the
safety of memory operations in this function, it was enough to require the validity
of the strings src and dest and sufficient memory behind the end of dest to
accommodate the contents of src. However, proving the functional correctness of
2 Since then we proved all the lemmas using techniques of auto-active verifivation [14,15],
in particular, lemma functions [16]. This work is available at [17].
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the implementation, it was revealed that it is necessary to formulate an additional
requirement stating that the sum of the string’s lengths fits the size_t type. The
function is implemented through the pointers iteration. Therefore, the ability to
prove the memory operation safety without the last requirement in the function
means that the AstraVer memory model does not take into account the possibility
of pointer overflow.
It was required to change the code of two functions to prove their correctness.
Despite the fact that we want to minimize code changes, in two cases we cannot
fully prove correctness without code modification. The functions memset and
strcmp use the implicit type cast with overflow. memset casts int to char,
and strcmp casts implicitly char to unsigned char. To mark these overflows
as intentional it was required to make the casts explicit. Our ACSL extension
with modulo arithmetic annotations still lacks the corresponding construction
(e. g., /*@(unsigned int %)*/) for implicit casts.
At the specification level, tools do not support the use of predicates in
definitions of logical functions or predicates as first arguments of the ternary
operator in lemmas and axioms. Because of this, it is sometimes difficult to give
an explicit definition of a logical function, and we have to use an axiomatic
(implicit) definition. This drawback prevents the explicit definition of the logical
functions for skip_spaces, strcspn, strpbrk, and strspn.
Functions from the file ctype.h (isspace, isdigit, isalnum, isgraph, islower, ...)
are defined as macros that operate on the array _ctype of 256 bytes, which
specifies the belonging of each character to a particular class. To simplify the
verification task, these macros have been replaced by inline functions: verification
tools do not allow the writing of specifications for macros, only for functions.
The _ctype array was redefined as a string (string initialization is translated
into model axioms) because the global array initialization is not translated into
the WhyML model. However, it was not possible to prove the correspondence
of functions from the ctype.h file to their specifications even after the described
transformations: solvers cannot cope with the proof when the model has an
axiomatic definition of the _ctype array 256 characters long.
8 Evaluation of Solvers
AstraVer translates Frama-C’s internal representation into the program
model in WhyML [19], based on the memory model and semantics of operations
with integers. The Why3 tool generates VCs for a WhyML program and converts
them into an input for solvers. Why3 supports a number of solvers, such as
Alt-Ergo, CVC3, CVC4, Z3, Spass, EProver, Simplify and others. Why3
also supports transformations of VCs, for example, splitting conjunctions into
separate conditions.
Alt-Ergo (1.30) and CVC4 (1.4) SMT solvers are able to discharge all
VCs generated (except for the one for memmove). However, it is interesting to
evaluate other solvers on the given benchmark. For that purpose we conduct an
experiment using the following system configuration: CPU — AMD FX-8120
(Eight-Core Processor), RAM — 16GB, time limit — 60 seconds, memory limit —
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6000MB, OS — GNU/Linux (kernel: 4.12.12 (smp preempt) x86_64), software
(from AstraVer repository):Why3 (0.87.3+git), Frama-C (Silicon-20161101),
Jessie2 (alpha3).
8.1 VC transformation strategy
To put all solvers in similar conditions all VCs were transformed by Why3
using the following strategy:
1. Split goal by conjuncts (split_goal_wp) repeatedly until fixed point.
2. Inline definition of all logical symbols (inline_all).
3. Split goal by conjuncts (split_goal_wp) repeatedly until fixed point.
4. Skolemize goal (introduce_premises).
If there are many predicates with long dependency chains, the inline_all
transformation makes the work of the solvers more difficult. This is not the case
for the given benchmark and experiments have shown the positive impact of
this transformation. The addition of introduce_premises transformation also
comes from preliminary experiments demonstrating that solvers work better with
formulas of the form 𝑓(𝑥)∧¬𝑔(𝑥) than with ones of the form ¬∀𝑥. 𝑓(𝑥) =⇒ 𝑔(𝑥).
Otherwise, the strategy tries to split the VC into the smallest possible conjuncts.
During the development of specifications, the strategy is not applied by default.
Only some of the transformations are applied if solvers fail to discharge VCs by
themselves.
Function VC Alt-Ergo CVC3 CVC4 CVC4 Eprover Spass Z3
1.30 2.4.1 1.4 1.5 1.9.1-001 3.9 4.5.0
total vc atime vc atime vc atime vc atime vc atime vc atime vc atime
_parse_integ. 282 276 0.10 280 0.83 X 0.18 X 0.10 212 0.24 197 1.69 279 0.06
check_bytes8 50 49 0.55 49 0.09 49 0.09 X 0.11 38 1.76 31 8.38 36 1.52
kstrtobool 1096 X 0.05 X 0.08 X 0.10 X 0.09 1006 0.13 937 0.38 1065 0.15
memchr 39 X 6.05 11 0.22 X 0.37 X 0.15 31 2.58 11 5.73 29 0.12
memcmp 60 58 0.13 X 0.15 58 0.10 X 0.10 49 0.51 36 4.45 55 0.15
memcpy 43 X 4.18 X 0.35 X 0.16 X 0.14 30 1.05 16 6.85 30 0.06
memmove 93*(92) 90 3.94 X 0.88 87 0.16 X 0.18 63 0.95 43 11.87 68 0.30
memscan 47 46 0.07 X 0.10 X 0.09 X 0.09 41 0.59 34 4.55 42 0.06
memset 27 26 5.02 14 0.19 X 0.19 X 0.16 19 3.82 12 11.12 18 0.08
skip_spaces 34 30 0.76 32 1.96 X 0.51 33 0.14 27 0.70 24 0.34 30 0.09
strcasecmp 58 50 0.43 52 1.65 57 0.79 X 0.53 43 0.28 35 2.85 49 0.49
strcat 73 68 0.58 66 2.16 X 1.13 71 0.17 54 2.56 39 0.67 60 0.94
strchr 43 35 4.57 23 0.17 X 0.23 X 0.22 31 1.03 24 3.65 32 0.11
strchrnul 46 42 2.07 37 0.26 X 0.19 X 0.16 40 1.91 31 2.27 39 0.31
strcmp 60 51 1.76 16 0.60 X 1.75 59 1.08 47 1.05 36 1.65 47 0.10
strcpy 46 43 1.33 45 0.66 X 0.48 X 0.17 33 1.13 26 0.65 39 1.43
strcspn 78 68 0.38 69 0.37 74 2.95 75 1.82 58 1.85 46 1.68 61 0.11
strlcpy 84 82 0.15 82 0.14 X 1.08 X 0.24 67 1.20 52 1.74 78 0.42
strlen 26 X 1.12 24 0.12 X 0.16 X 0.23 19 3.36 14 2.96 21 0.08
strnchr 49 38 4.44 19 0.23 46 3.34 X 0.72 35 2.57 24 1.56 27 0.09
strncmp 102 81 2.57 25 0.25 94 2.39 99 2.32 76 1.06 55 2.56 76 0.57
strnlen 44 39 1.91 42 1.04 39 1.23 X 1.31 31 2.40 26 5.52 32 0.08
strpbrk 70 57 0.64 58 1.54 62 3.18 67 1.57 48 1.89 39 0.75 53 0.09
strrchr 62 53 4.57 12 0.17 X 1.09 60 0.85 46 2.33 31 4.67 46 0.11
strsep 62 60 0.25 60 0.09 X 0.19 X 0.15 55 0.12 51 1.48 58 0.06
strspn 107 99 0.84 100 0.69 104 1.32 103 0.61 89 1.37 75 1.59 91 0.13
TOTAL 2781 2645 0.90 2454 0.42 2740 0.61 2761 0.37 2288 0.76 1945 1.72 2461 0.22
Table 1. Solvers. Proofs Statistics (times are given in seconds)
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Alt-Ergo CVC3 CVC4 CVC4 Eprover Spass Z3
1.30 2.4.1 1.4 1.5 1.9.1-001 3.9 4.5.0
mtime uniq mtime uniq mtime uniq mtime uniq mtime uniq mtime uniq mtime uniq
58.75 1 56.68 0 57.97 7 52.27 20 47.80 0 59.74 0 26.74 0
Table 2. Solvers. Max Time and Number of Uniq Proofs
8.2 Statistics
Table 1 presents the results of the evaluation. The first column contains the
target function name the second one includes the number of VCs generated
(safety and behavioral) after application of the transformation strategy. The rest
of the table presents solver statistics: the amount of discharged VCs and the
average time for successful runs.
The symbol X marks cases when a solver proved all VCs for the corresponding
function. Maximal numbers of discharged VCs are highlighted in green. Minimal
VC counts are highlighted by red. The minimal average time is highlighted in
cyan, the maximal average time is highlighted in brown.
8.3 Discussion
All VCs except one for memmove are successfully discharged by at least one
of the solvers. The best result was achieved by Alt-Ergo and CVC4. This is
expected as those solvers were most extensively used during the development
and testing of the toolset.
CVC4 1.5 discharged the greatest number of VCs, while Z3 required the
smallest amount of time. This can be partially explained by the fact that we
counted only successful proof attempts. Z3 was able to prove fewer VCs than
Alt-Ergo or CVC4.
Table 2 presents maximal solving times for successful proof attempts and
counts of unique proofs, i. e., VCs that were only discharged by one of the solvers.
9 Conclusion
This paper presents results from the development and evaluation of a deductive
verification benchmark consisting of 26 unmodified Linux kernel library functions
implementing conventional memory and string operations. Formal contracts of
the functions were extracted from their source code and were represented in the
form of preconditions and postconditions. The benchmark detected a number
of problems with existing deductive verification toolchains. Some of the issues
required only fixes in the tools, some of them led to the design of proposals to
extend ACSL language, others were left open.
For example, two newly proposed ACSL constructs allowed us to successfully
proof 11 more functions without modification of their source code. With these
extensions, the authors have successfully and fully proved the correctness of
23 functions. Another 2 functions were proved after a minor modification of
their source code, while the final one cannot be completely proved using existing
memory model. Specifications of the benchmark contain ≈ 2.6 times as many
lines as the source code of the library functions.
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The source code of the benchmark and proof protocols are publicly available
together with instructions describing how to reproduce the results [7]. The
benchmark can be used for the testing and evaluation of deductive verification
tools and the starting point for verifying other parts of Linux kernel. A possible
next step is to extend the benchmark with other library functions (e. g., bitwise
operations).
References
1. Baudin, P., Cuoq, P., Filliâtre, J.C., Marché, C., Monate, B., Moy, Y., Prevosto,
V.: Acsl: Ansi/iso c specification language. Tech. Rep. 1.12, CEA LIST and INRIA
(March 2017)
2. Kirchner, F., Kosmatov, N., Prevosto, V., Signoles, J., Yakobowski, B.: Frama-c: A
software analysis perspective. Formal Aspects of Computing 27(3), 573–609 (May
2015), https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-014-0326-7
3. Moy, Y.: Automatic Modular Static Safety Checking for C Programs. Ph.D. thesis,
Université Paris-Sud (January 2009), http://www.lri.fr/~marche/moy09phd.pdf
4. Mandrykin, M.U., Khoroshilov, A.V.: Region analysis for deductive verification
of c programs. Programming and Computer Software 42(5), 257–278 (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/S0361768816050042
5. Carvalho, N., Silva Sousa, C., Pinto, J.S., Tomb, A.: Formal verification of klibc
with the wp frama-c plug-in. In: Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium
on NASA Formal Methods - Volume 8430. pp. 343–358. Springer-Verlag New York,
Inc., New York, NY, USA (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06200-
6_29
6. Torlakcik, M.: Contracts in OpenBSD. Msc. dissertation report, University College
Dublin (2010)
7. Verker: Verification of linux kernel library functions (2017), https://forge.ispras.
ru/projects/verker
8. Burghardt, J., Clausecker, R., Gerlach, J., Pohl, H.: ACSL by example. Tech. rep.,
Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems (2017)
9. Cok, D.R., Blissard, I., Robbins, J.: C library annotations in acsl for frama-c:
experience report. Tech. rep., GrammaTech, Inc. (March 2017)
10. Hubert, T., Marché, C.: Separation analysis for deductive verification. In: Heap
Analysis and Verification (HAV’07). pp. 81–93. Braga, Portugal (March 2007),
http://www.lri.fr/~marche/hubert07hav.pdf
11. ISO/IEC 9899: 2011: C11 standard for C programming language. Standard, JTC
and ISO (2011), http://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg14/www/docs/n1570.pdf
12. Moy, Y.: Union and cast in deductive verification. In: Proceedings of the C/C++
Verification Workshop. vol. Technical Report ICIS-R07015, pp. 1–16. Radboud
University Nijmegen (July 2007), http://www.lri.fr/~moy/Publis/moy07ccpp.pdf
13. Mandrykin, M.U., Khoroshilov, A.V.: High-level memory model with low-level
pointer cast support for jessie intermediate language. Programming and Computer
Software 41(4), 197–207 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/S0361768815040040
14. Leino, K.R.M., Moskal, M.: Usable auto-active verification (2010)
15. Dross, C., Moy, Y.: Auto-active proof of red-black trees in spark. In: Barrett,
C., Davies, M., Kahsai, T. (eds.) NASA Formal Methods. pp. 68–83. Springer
International Publishing, Cham (2017)
16. Jacobs, B., Smans, J., Piessens, F.: A quick tour of the verifast program verifier.
In: Proceedings of the 8th Asian Conference on Programming Languages and
18 Denis Efremov, Mikhail Mandrykin, and Alexey Khoroshilov
Systems. pp. 304–311. APLAS’10, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg (2010), http:
//dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1947873.1947902
17. Verker: Verification of linux kernel library functions, lemma functions branch (2017),
https://forge.ispras.ru/projects/verker/repository?rev=lemma_functions
18. Delahaye, M., Kosmatov, N., Signoles, J.: Common specification language for static
and dynamic analysis of c programs. In: Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM
Symposium on Applied Computing. pp. 1230–1235. SAC ’13, ACM, New York, NY,
USA (2013), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2480362.2480593
19. Filliâtre, J.C., Paskevich, A.: Why3 — where programs meet provers. In: Felleisen,
M., Gardner, P. (eds.) Proceedings of the 22nd European Symposium on Program-
ming. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7792, pp. 125–128. Springer (Mar
2013)
